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Abstract 
 
This study moves beyond current perspectives of European Union (EU) implementation 
research to paint a comprehensive picture of the fine-tuning of domestic regulations beyond 
compliance. We compare the hitherto unexplored veterinary drugs regulations of four member 
states, France, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom, with those of the non-member 
Switzerland. We link causal mechanisms back to three differing theoretical assumptions about 
European integration. These theories are confronted using congruence analysis in a 
comparative case study design. We find evidence for historical institutionalism and for the 
domestic politics hypothesis. The assumption of a neo-functionalist development of 
regulations is only weakly supported.  
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Similar solutions to transboundary problems? 
 
The European Union (EU) evolved in response to increasing transboundary challenges to 
secure the efficient functioning of markets through regulation (Majone 1996). While a broad 
body of knowledge on compliance with EU law exists (e.g., Falkner et al. 2005, Mastenbroek 
and Kaeding 2006, Perkins and Neumayer 2007), the question of the actual fine-tuning of 
domestic policies remains largely unexamined. Even if correctly transposed, community law 
still allows member states considerable space for interpretation, leading to differences in the 
application of EU rules that were originally intended to be uniform (Falkner et al. 2005, Knill 
and Tosun 2012: 242). Indeed, the European experience illustrates how far‐reaching economic 
integration can be reconciled with legitimate differences in national preferences (Majone 
1999, Schmidt 2008). An impressive range of explanatory factors have been identified for the 
adoption of EU law. We argue together with Treib (2008: 18) that “for the progress of EU 
implementation research as a whole, however, it would be even more desirable to link these 
results back to theoretical arguments”. To address this gap, we ask: Do compliant countries 
really have similar regulations? What underlying theoretical assumption about integration 
serves best to explain the emergence of domestic regulations?   
This paper provides a systematic empirical analysis of the regulations which govern the 
dispensing of veterinary drugs for livestock; these play a major role in securing animal health 
and food safety and have hitherto been understudied (Treib 2008: 16; for pharmaceutical 
marketing authorizations, see Vogel 1998, Krapohl 2007). The study compares four EU 
member states with a non-member state. We investigate to what extent the regulations of 
Germany, Austria, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Switzerland resemble each other. 
Our aim is infer the appropriateness of three theoretical assumptions about the evolution of 
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international institutions (Starke et al. 2008: 978), which are applied to analyse the 
implementation of regulations at the national level.  
A first, functionalist hypothesis has been advanced by Vogel (1998: 18), who argues that 
“political pressures for more rapid drug approval in both Europe and the United States, and 
the experience of international co-operation itself” lead to the globalisation of pharmaceutical 
regulation. In this case, all countries should apply similar solutions to shared problems, 
whether they are members of the EU or not. A second, historical-institutionalist hypothesis 
proposes a path-dependent development of supranational regulatory regimes (Krapohl 2007), 
which would imply greater variation between EU members and non-members than among EU 
member states. A third hypothesis encapsulates Majone’s (1996) argument that domestic 
politics are the most decisive factor for policy outcomes (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006); as 
a result, there should be a tendency for regulations to diverge in line with domestic 
preferences.  
In the next section, the theoretical assumptions are presented and hypotheses are derived. The 
presentation of the method and research design in section three is followed by the two-tiered 
empirical assessment. The concluding section discusses the findings and answers the research 
questions.  
 
Three theories about European integration 
 
The expectation that the EU would facilitate similar solutions to common problems rests upon 
a basic assumption about the nature of integration. Until the 1970s, neo-functionalism was the 
predominant view. However, as the course of events challenged neo-functionalist 
assumptions, alternative integration theories took over, amongst them supranationalism, 
intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism and the domestic politics approach (Keohane 
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and Hoffmann 1991, Corbey 1995: 254-258, Pierson 1996, Puchala 1999, Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2000, Peterson 2001).  
Various conceptually related processes may lead to similar policies (Knill 2005: 765-768, 
Starke et al. 2008) (see Table 1). International factors tend to foster convergence, such as 
policy problems that exceed national boundaries (for example, Armingeon and Bonoli 2006), 
policy learning processes (Zito and Schout 2009), and regulatory competition (Starke et al. 
2008: 979). The transfer of policies can also be fostered by joint affiliation in international 
institutions or even be non-voluntary by means of legal harmonisation (Knill 2005, Scharpf 
2010). Conversely, domestic political and institutional factors can lead to divergent 
regulations (for example, Falkner et al. 2005, Krapohl 2007). We argue below that these 
mechanisms can be attributed to three basic theoretical currents about integration: neo-
functionalism, historical institutionalism, and domestic politics. 
 
“Insert Table 1 about here” 
 
Competing theories agree upon basic concepts but disagree about the causal connections 
between them (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 156). Unlike supranationalism or 
intergovernmentalism, the three theories assessed here are not merely concerned with 
“history-making decisions” at the supranational level (Peterson 2001: 294). By making 
different assumptions about the main driving factors behind the emergence of national 
institutions,1 they disagree about the relative importance of these factors for the emergence of 
similar domestic regulations (that is, integration). 
These theories are not mutually exclusive, but they do emphasize the different causal 
                                                 
1 Institutions are defined as the “(…) formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organisational structure of the polity (…)” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). 
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mechanisms that they find decisive. Neo-functionalists do not deny a causal role of 
institutions or harmonisation (Puchala 1999: 319), nor does the domestic politics approach 
preclude the influence of functional pressures. Although basic differences exist between the 
teleologies of institutionalist and neo-functionalist theories (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 
Peterson 2001: 297), Peterson (2001) notes a lack of theories of EU governance which are 
true rivals. Rather, existing models explain different outcomes at different levels of the EU 
multi-tiered system. Since there is no unified meta-theory of European integration, it should 
be specified what different approaches do or do not explain (Puchala 1999). We aim to do 
precisely this, by assessing the relative strength of these three theories to explain the 
(dis)similarity of regulations in the cases under investigation.  
We present these approaches in the following sections. We derive basic assumptions about the 
pattern of similarity they lead us to expect. Our expectations focus only on the core 
assumptions of each theory about the decisive causal mechanisms, which necessarily implies 
some degree of oversimplification. 
 
Neo-functionalism: form follows function 
 
Neo-functionalism conceives integration as a mainly apolitical effect of economic-functional 
requirements and technical interdependences between states and policy areas. An alignment 
of policies can be expected between all countries where these functional pressures prevail 
(Armingeon and Bonoli 2006). The idea of functional spillover implies that co-operation in 
one field leads to integration in adjoining fields. If integration in one policy sector is 
hampered by non-integration in functionally linked areas, then efforts to overcome these 
problems will lead to further integration (Corbey 1995: 254-258, Renner 2009). The idea of 
spillover effects is linked to policy learning in an increasingly interconnected world (Knill 
6 
 
2005: 766, Zito and Schout 2009). Spillover occurs when policy actors strongly commit 
themselves to integration (Tranholm and Mikkelsen 1991: 4–6, cited in Macmillan 2009: 
791): “Political spillover encompasses the integrative pressures exerted by national élites, 
who realize that problems of substantial interest cannot be satisfactorily solved at the 
domestic level” (Niemann 1998: 430). Such integrative processes tend to happen “in sectors 
where the intensity and value of cross-national transactions” are already relatively high 
(Sandholtz and Sweet 2010: 11). Thus, by way of the spillover, “policy integration would 
intensify and expand through the policy process” (Stephenson 2012: 801). For veterinary 
drugs regulations, spillover effects can be expected from or to the European single market for 
food products and the regulations of feedstuffs (Ugland and Veggeland 2006: 612).   
If form follows function, then all countries affected by a problem have a similar incentive to 
react, independently of their institutional affiliation. Therefore, we ought to find similarity 
between the regulations of all countries, whether they are members of the EU or not. Co-
operation at the supranational level creates spillover effects over time. Hence, a neo-
functionalist perspective grants importance to EU membership as leading to similar 
regulations. The decisive observation is the behaviour of the non-member who shares similar 
functional problems, especially if some form of co-operation occurs. 
 
Historical institutionalism: no institution emerges from a tabula rasa 
 
Amongst new institutionalist theories, rational choice institutionalism stresses the role of 
actors, whereas sociological institutionalism states that institutions influence actors’ 
preferences and perceptions, leading to institutional isomorphism. Historical institutionalism 
argues that institutions and history matter. Regulations emerge in a path-dependent way; past 
policies and the polity’s institutional organisation structure subsequent policy choices. 
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Context matters; the same operative forces will not generate the same result everywhere. 
Moreover, institutions privilege some interests while constraining others, which leads to 
distinct national outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996: 937, 941-942, Haverland 2000, Lodge 
2007: 279).  
Historical institutionalism divides the flow of historical events into periods of continuity 
punctuated by critical junctures, which open windows of opportunity for substantial 
institutional changes. However, the political opportunity structure determines whether this 
window is exploited by political actors. If this does not occur, institutions are conceived as 
remaining very stable and resistant to change (“sticky”) (Pierson 1996, Krapohl 2007: 28-29). 
Institutional change happens gradually as the result of a long-term incremental process 
(Pierson 2004: 82, Streeck and Thelen 2005, Steunenberg and Kaeding 2009). In this research 
tradition, it is the interplay of path dependency, domestic politics, and country-specific 
problem pressures that accounts for policy variation (Starke et al. 20058: 979, for example, 
Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, Maggetti et al. 2011). 
Some institutionalist arguments focus on the role of legal harmonisation and legal-
administrative factors in the EU as leading to positive or negative integration (Schmidt 2008, 
Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009, Scharpf 2010). Member states have historically and 
incrementally developed similar regulations due to their obligation to follow community 
orders. EU commission directives influence domestic policy choices in the aftermath of 
crises. Policy actors are organized and lobby in Brussels. Even if countries face similar 
challenges, then these elements are missing in non-member states; the pre-existing institutions 
differ following EU membership and prominently explain policy choices (Knill and Tosun 
2012: 81). To support the historical-institutionalist hypothesis, we should observe greater 
variation of policies between EU members and non-members than among EU member states.2 
                                                 
2 While this outcome would also be expected according to institutional isomorphism, our argument is crucially 
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Although the domestic policies are still filtered through distinct national institutions during 
implementation, EU members have a common institutional basis upon which new regulations 
are built. Our conception of the outcome allows the domestic regulations to differ, so long as 
they have at least some commonalities. 
 
Domestic politics: the actor-centered perspective 
 
Functionalist and institutionalist theories are challenged by a third perspective, according to 
which domestic politics are decisive for policy outcomes (Falkner et al. 2005, Mastenbroek 
and Kaeding 2006). Without denying the importance of institutions (Knill and Tosun 2012: 
91ff), the domestic politics approach focuses on actors and their preferences. In this view, 
national policy making is mainly influenced by domestic political processes and power 
structures (Treib 2003: 509).  
A transnational alignment of policies faces difficulties for two reasons. First, each 
government acts as a defender of the national status quo during transposition. Second, 
political party constellations, the resulting preferences, and veto powers predominate in 
determining policy outcomes (Treib 2003, Oosterwaal and Torenvlied 2012). If we assume 
that these political-institutional factors are unique for each country, then so will be the policy 
outcomes. Thus, the domestic politics perspective expects little similarity between the 
countries’ regulations, regardless of the existence of EU directives. 
We can now formulate assumptions about the kind of observations that can be expected or 
not, according to the core assumptions of these three theories (Table 2).  
 
                                                 
based on the idea of path-dependency. 
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 “Insert Table 2 about here” 
 
Research design 
 
We test these three differing expectations by analysing regulations of the dispensing of 
veterinary drugs for livestock in Europe. We thereby follow calls in EU implementation 
research to include policy sectors that have hitherto attracted only scant attention (Treib 2008: 
16). Dispensing denotes the process by which a veterinary drug reaches the end user who 
administers it to the animal. As Figure 1 illustrates, this process has no direct transboundary 
dimension, which grants countries relatively extensive legislative leeway. This makes 
dispensing policies a particularly rigorous touchstone on which to test assumptions about the 
conditions under which similar regulations arise.  
 
“ Insert Figure 1 about here” 
 
We focus on four sub-aspects. First, general dispensing policies regulate the access to and the 
distribution of veterinary drugs for livestock. Second, we analyse the regulations of medicated 
feedstuffs, a mixture of a veterinary drug with feed. Third, the requirements for 
documentation of the dispensing process enable the authorities to control compliance and to 
trace the sources of animal diseases or contaminated food across borders. Finally, EU law 
prescribes frequent controls of compliance with the dispensing rules, while their further 
enforcement falls to the member states. Country case studies are provided in the online 
appendix. These policies are operationalized according to 29 indicators, which were chosen 
for their direct comparability and clear distinguishability from other processes in the lifecycle 
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of a veterinary drug (Table B online appendix).  Data were collected through expert 
interviews with agents of the central administration and stakeholder groups and an analysis of 
legal bases, policy documents, and secondary literature (see Sager et al. 2011 for case studies 
and a list of all legal sources). 
 
Congruence analysis and case selection  
 
Due to the theoretical and empirical complexity of our research object, we conducted a 
qualitative in-depth analysis of theoretically interesting cases. Since we seek congruence 
between our theoretical assumptions and the empirical information, we applied congruence 
analysis (Blatter and Haverland 2012). This method focuses on observations that discriminate 
between rival theories by providing evidence for the correctness of one theory and the 
incorrectness of another theory at the same time. Congruence analysis implies that concepts 
can have different meanings depending on their theoretical embedding (see Table 2). For 
example, the expression of domestic actors’ interests reveals the political opportunity 
structure within historical institutionalism, but also domestic pressures in the domestic politics 
approach. Thus, one should rely not only on single observations, but on clusters of 
observations to obtain a picture which is meaningful in the light of the theoretical framework. 
This picture is then contrasted with the meanings within the other theoretical frameworks 
(Blatter and Blume 2008: 332, 343) to reduce the risk of a “confirmation bias” (Blatter and 
Haverland 2012: 174). 
We proceeded in two stages. By means of descriptive statistics, we first tested whether the 
countries’ regulations resemble each other. The regulations of the 29 policy aspects in each 
country were compared with those of every other country according to whether they are fully, 
partially or not at all similar (see Table C online appendix). This allows an indicative 
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assessment of the congruence of the three theoretical expectations with the observations.  
Holzinger and Knill (2005) warn of the pitfall of inferring from the similarity of policies to 
the explanation at work. Thus, in a second step, we undertook a qualitative in-depth 
examination of selected policy aspects to explain how the regulations emerged (Howlett and 
Newman 2013). Each hypothesis was examined in this way. Alternative explanations and 
puzzling observations identified in the quantitative overview were discussed. 
During the first analytical step, our cases were the regulations for the dispensing of veterinary 
drugs in France, Germany, Austria, the UK and Switzerland. A most-similar-cases design was 
employed to preclude the risk that contextual features explain the observed differences 
(Blatter and Haverland 2012: 42). Because livestock farming has a similar relevance for 
agriculture (Sager et al. 2011: 301), the countries face comparable regulatory requirements. 
The four EU members have been members ever since the first veterinary drugs regulations 
were issued in the early 1990s, and they share a tendency toward low compliance (Falkner et 
al. 2005). The second analytical step focused on specific policies as cases that represent “most 
likely cases”, meaning that the theory in question has a high probability of explaining the case 
(Blatter and Blume 2008: 347, Blatter and Haverland 2012: 167-178). Accordingly, the causal 
factors proposed by the theory which is tested by the case were present and could be expected 
to be at work. 
Considering a non-member state enables us to assess the role of EU membership for 
integration, while the context should ensure the cases’ comparability as being “crucial” for the 
theories tested (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 177ff). Functionally, the European non-EU 
member’s similar agricultural sectors should have a comparable significance; a high 
significance of fishery, for instance, would create entirely different regulatory requirements. 
Relative democratic and political stability since the early 1990s when the first EU regulations 
emerged should ensure the country’s comparable regulatory capacity. Although covering a 
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variety of non-EU member countries might enhance the results’ analytical leverage, 
Switzerland is the only European non-EU member that complies with our “most similar” 
assumptions (see Table A online appendix). 
Since 1 January 2009, Switzerland has a contractual obligation for equivalence to relevant EU 
rules (veterinary agreement). As a consequence, its legislation is checked for Euro-
compatibility (Linder 2011: 46). This can lead to the transposition of EU law into Swiss law, 
however often subject to the regular legislative and democratic processes (Maggetti et al. 
2011). The Swiss administration tends only to identify a need for revision if a rule directly 
contradicts the EU provision. From a neo-functionalist perspective, this institutionalized co-
operation of Switzerland with the EU should have fostered spillover effects. The historical 
institutionalist perspective would view the veterinary agreement as opening a window of 
opportunity for adapting to EU rules, provided that the political opportunity structure is given. 
The domestic politics argument would assume domestic interest constellations to be decisive, 
regardless of the presence of co-operation with the EU. 
Ordinary veterinary drugs are usually regulated in Directive 2001/82/EC, and medicated 
feedstuffs in Council Directive 90/167/EEC (see Table B online appendix). That the policies 
were subject to transposition processes is crucial to testing the domestic politics assumption. 
The EU rules had generally been adopted by all five countries by 2011 (Sager et al. 2011). 
There is one policy aspect in which Switzerland has not established full equivalence yet, and 
roughly one third of the analysed variables are not regulated in community law at all. Our 
case selection enables us to assess the relevance of both the existence of EU legislation and 
the non-member’s institutionalized co-operation with the EU for policy integration. 
 
Confronting theories of integration 
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Same-same but different? 
 
To paint a comprehensive picture of the policies’ (dis)similarity, cases of partial and full 
similarity are merged, and their number is expressed as a percentage of all policies for each 
comparison of two countries. This facilitates calculating the average similarity of policies 
between all countries, between Switzerland and the EU members, and between the EU 
members. Table 3 distinguishes between policies that are regulated by an EU directive and 
those that are not. It reveals that the countries do use the leeway left by the EU directives. 
Despite the fact that Switzerland has been subject to the EU standards since 2009, its rules are 
considerably more distinct from the EU member countries’ regulations than the member 
states’ regulations from each other. Table 4 below, which differentiates between the four 
aspects of dispensing, shows that this holds both for those aspects that have been transposed 
by Switzerland, and for the documentation requirements where it has not. 
 
“Insert Table 3 about here” 
 
“Insert Table 4 about here” 
 
Most interestingly, Switzerland resembles the other countries equally or even more in the 
absence of EU standards (regulations of inspections) than in aspects regulated by community 
law. Apparently, that Switzerland has been committed to these directives since 2009 has not 
been decisive for its policy choices. By contrast, for EU members, the existence of EU 
directives does make a remarkable difference. Member states pursue individual solutions if 
they can: there is a stronger similarity on average if an EU directive exists than if there are no 
common standards. If the latter is the case, the extent of dissimilarity no longer varies with 
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EU membership. These findings point to the importance of domestic politics as soon as there 
is enough scope for action. 
This is clearly the pattern we would expect according to historical-institutionalist 
assumptions, stressing the importance of path dependencies and pre-existing institutions. In 
turn, we find surprisingly little evidence for neo-functionalist assumptions, according to 
which EU-membership would be largely irrelevant for the emergence of similar policies. Nor 
do we find strong evidence for the domestic politics hypothesis at first glance: under certain 
circumstances, policies do resemble each other to a great extent.  
 
Is it about problems, actors, or institutions? 
 
Each hypothesis is now tested based on a selected policy aspect. We assess whether the 
evolution of the domestic regulations corresponds to the theoretical expectations, which are 
further specified beforehand. We also discuss whether two alternative explanations have been 
at work (Blatter and Haverland 2012). 
 
The neo-functional hypothesis   
 
Neo-functionalism expects the regulations of the non-member to be similar to the other 
countries when a) similar problem pressures lead to similar solutions, regardless of existing 
institutions, and b) close co-operation in related policy fields creates spillover effects over 
time as political élites exercise integrative pressures. Such mechanisms are likely to happen 
with the regulations of supply shortfalls of veterinary medicines. 
When no registered veterinary drug is available for rare species and maladies, drugs not 
authorized for the specific use can be dispensed instead. The European Cascade rule allows 
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the veterinarian to dispense a) a veterinary drug authorized in the country for use with another 
animal species, or for another condition in the same species; b) either a human medicinal 
product authorized in the country, or a veterinary drug not authorized in the country but 
authorized in another member state; or c) a drug prepared according to formula magistralis 
(see online appendix). The irregular use of medicines raises the issue of drug residues in food 
products. The dispensing rules for supply shortages need to ensure both the proper treatment 
of animals and the safety of the end product – ultimately, consumer health in a European 
single market. They have a direct effect on the safety and exportability of animal food 
products. The EU is the main export destination for Swiss animal food products. Hence, there 
are strong shared functional requirements, and we can expect close collaboration in the trade 
in agrarian products to lead to integration in this intertwined aspect. 
Indeed, the EU Cascade rule has been implemented in all five countries. It has been binding 
for EU members since 2001. Yet it took Switzerland another nine years to adopt the Cascade 
rule in 2010 during a minor revision of the Tierarzneimittelverordnung (Sager et al. 2011). 
Although functional pressures to ensure the exportability of Swiss food products and the 
competitiveness of Swiss livestock farmers already existed after 2001, the Swiss rules resisted 
change. Functional requirements were not decisive for the adoption of the European rule, but 
the legal obligation for equivalence in the year 2009. The veterinary agreement opened a 
window of opportunity for the policy’s revision which was exploited proactively by the 
administration. 
In line with the historical institutionalist expectations in Table 2, the EU members 
implemented the EU template, while the Swiss regulations remained unchanged in this respect 
until the institutionalized co-operation with the EU facilitated change. The neo-functionalist 
explanation of functional spillover and the predominant relevance of functional pressures for 
integration hardly applies even to this most likely case. Domestic politics may have 
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influenced the delay in establishing equivalence. In Switzerland, veterinarians influence 
policy making more actively than the agricultural producers’ associations. Veterinarians find 
the Cascade rule too restrictive, whereas producers are more interested in the exportability of 
their products (Sager et al. 2011: 379). Yet these interest constellations were ultimately not 
decisive (see Table 2). The historical sequence by which Switzerland finally adopted the EU 
rules is most congruent with a historical institutionalist explanation. 
 
  The domestic politics hypothesis   
 
The expectation that national regulations tend to differ from each other rests upon the 
assumption that there are a) strong domestic interest constellations defended by the actors 
concerned by the regulations and b) domestic political processes that are c) very specific to 
countries, leading to diverse policy outcomes. This could be the case for the regulations of 
medicated feedstuffs. 
Feedstuffs are the most common route of application for antibiotics, and often used 
excessively to compensate for the negative health effects of intensive livestock farming. This 
may lead to antibiotic resistances, which can be passed on to human consumers. Whereas 
farmers tend to emphasize their individual responsibility, veterinarians and regulatory bodies 
call for more restrictive rules (Sager et al. 2011: 375). This has led to particularly strict EU 
requirements for the manufacturing of medicated feedstuffs, both by feed mills and through 
on-farm manufacturing (OFM). Nonetheless, EU law leaves some leeway, as the countries are 
free to define specific conditions for OFM. Since these rules can represent a significant hurdle 
for the producers, they are likely to be disputed, with the livestock owners trying to defend 
their freedom for OFM, and veterinarians calling for better animal health. The reactions of the 
national regulators will depend on their specific regulatory priorities. 
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Indeed, the solutions in the countries are multi-faceted and independent of their EU 
membership. Germany has completely prohibited OFM and seriously complicated the 
business for feed mills. This highly contested procedure was in line with a broader regulatory 
strategy for preventing antibiotic resistances. France allows OFM; however, since 2004 it has 
been bound to such numerous administrative hurdles and restrictions that it is virtually never 
practised. This strategy was motivated by a consensus that OFM increases the risk of an 
unsafe use of veterinary drugs. Industrially manufactured medicated feedstuffs prevail. By 
contrast, the UK’s liberal rules for OFM stress the livestock owners’ individual responsibility. 
While the blending must be supervised by “qualified persons”, there are no legal requirements 
as to their qualification. British policy makers deliberately focus on non-binding codes of 
conduct. The support for this strategy from both livestock owners and veterinarians is 
reflected in their membership in the Responsible Use of Medicines in Agriculture Alliance. In 
Switzerland, OFM since 2004 has only been allowed where necessary for two days if the 
process is supervised by a specially qualified veterinarian (Sager et al. 2014). The Swiss 
regulations resisted change until the institutionalized co-operation with the EU facilitated 
policy change. Typical for the Swiss consensus style, the policy makers sought to maintain 
the liberty of livestock owners while ensuring the controllability of the process. The quite 
influential veterinarians who regularly urge more restrictions on the use for antibiotics (Sager 
et al. 2011: 375) were considered suitable for ensuring the correct procedure. 
In Austria, OFM is highly but rather liberally regulated. Within the private 
Tiergesundheitsdienste (TGD), farmers are permitted to undertake OFM in unrestricted 
amounts, provided they undergo the obligatory training for this and are accompanied by a 
veterinarian. The voluntary TGD were created in 2003 as part of a governmental strategy to 
reduce the use of veterinary drugs and enhance legal certainty for users. OFM has a high 
practical relevance in Austria. Thus, the regulations meet the needs of Austrian farmers 
particularly well. 
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These national solutions differ quite substantially, as expected by the domestic politics 
hypothesis (see Table 2). They reflect domestic regulatory strategies and the interests of the 
actors involved. An important factor limiting integration between EU member states was the 
leeway left by the EU minimal standards, which made their effective adoption and 
interpretation a political question. 
As for the neo-functionalist hypothesis, the issue of resistances to antibiotics among 
consumers is highly salient in all countries, and the sector is closely integrated with the 
regulations of animal feed. Nonetheless, neither were there spillover effects nor did functional 
problem pressures foster similar solutions, which is not congruent with the expectations in 
Table 2. Similarly, pre-existing institutions cannot explain the different outcomes. The use of 
medicated feed and OFM used to be common practice in all countries prior to and even after 
the issuing of Directive 90/167/EEC; historical institutionalism would hence have expected 
more similar regulations.  
 
The historical-institutionalist hypothesis  
 
The assumption that the regulations of EU countries resemble each other more than Swiss 
regulations resemble them rests upon the idea that there are a) rules in form and/or in use 
which b) EU member states (used to) share but Switzerland does not so that c) their 
“stickiness” and path-dependent development over time has not yet led to an equal level of 
similarity, although Switzerland is bound to EU standards. The documentation requirements 
for veterinary drugs dispensing provide the prerequisites for such a development. 
Documentation rules significantly affect the actors’ everyday professional lives. They are 
disputed; compliance is an omnipresent issue (Sager et al. 2014). The EU documentation 
requirements date back to 2001; they were adopted by its members subsequently. Switzerland, 
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too, issued documentation regulations three years later, five years before the veterinary 
agreement. Yet, the Swiss rules are more liberal than the EU standards and even today have 
not been adjusted to the EU norms.  
Thus, contrary to the Cascade rule example, the bilateral agreement of 2009 has not played 
the role of a critical juncture here: the political opportunity structure did not enable a change 
in the Swiss documentation system. The widespread opposition against more restrictive 
documentation rules amongst the Swiss policy addressees and even among national regulators 
is not caused by strong functional interests. Most respondents indicate that the costs of such 
an adaptation are very low. The main argument is simply that one has gotten used to doing it 
this way. This is a typical example of the “stickiness” of an institution.  
Whereas this could also be a case of domestic politics, strong opposition equally existed in the 
other countries, which, however, did adopt the EU norms. Therefore, the motives behind this 
opposition are not political, but simple inertia (Table 2). Common problem pressures as 
assumed by neo-functionalism exist: transboundary traceability when food scandals occur is 
essential in a single market. In principle, the Swiss documentation rules are sufficient to 
ensure traceability. Yet, functional requirements were not the main motive for the voluntary 
adoption of these rules. In Switzerland, a series of scandals about drug residues co-occurred 
with first reports about food-related resistances to antibiotics around the year 2000. A small 
group of influential officials and representatives of the veterinarians’ association then urged 
the Swiss Federal Office for Public Health to regulate the target groups. Thus, these scandals 
opened a window of opportunity that was exploited. Neo-functionalism cannot explain the 
remaining differences to the EU; similar problems and the institutionalized co-operation since 
2009 should have led to similar solutions (cf. Table 2). The EU countries’ rules were based on 
the EU directive from the outset. The rules in Switzerland, however, are based on a 
contrasting regime and have survived despite co-operation in related areas. This is a clear-cut 
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case of the path-dependent, persistent institutions predicted by historical institutionalism (cf. 
Table 2). 
 
Discussion  
 
At first glance, the emergence of veterinary drugs regulations in the five countries appears to 
correspond most closely to neo-functionalist expectations. Transboundary problems related to 
animal diseases, residues of veterinary drugs in food products, and resistances to antibiotics 
created a demand for regulation that was satisfied by the European Veterinary Medicines 
Directive and national regulations. Switzerland, embedded in the European single market for 
agricultural products, concluded a bilateral veterinary agreement in order to remain 
competitive. 
However, a closer analysis of the domestic regulations reveals that the neo-functionalist 
theory can neither account for the remaining differences nor provide an adequate explanation 
for their emergence. Policy changes required more than functional pressures: a combination of 
critical events with an appropriate political opportunity structure. The pattern of resemblance 
of the national regulations and their emergence mostly correspond to the expectation of path 
dependency of historical institutionalism. Moreover, even EU countries used their scope of 
action whenever community law or its absence left them some leeway, which is when 
domestic politics became decisive for policy outcomes. Notwithstanding this, two aspects of 
Table 3 require further discussion.  
 
Integration and regulation 
 
Why do the EU countries’ regulations not resemble each other more than they resemble the 
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Swiss rules in aspects not regulated by EU law? Apparently, it was the existence of EU 
requirements that was decisive for integration and not institutional affiliation to the EU (Table 
2). In the absence of a concrete common institution, no path-dependent development toward 
similar regulations took place. This provides quite strong evidence against the idea of 
spillover effects. Such a concrete institution may be an EU rule, but it does not have to be. 
One instance is the rules regarding the actors who are authorized to prescribe and dispense 
veterinary drugs for livestock. EU law sets a general prescription requirement without 
specifying actors. It sets a duty to obtain an authorisation and registration for dispensing 
actors; internet retail is unregulated. The countries’ regulations share the common 
characteristic that registered veterinarians may prescribe the medicines, and pharmacies can 
dispense them. This pattern is rooted in the institutional organisation of the pharmaceutical 
sector per se that prevails everywhere.  
Going beyond that, France has defined unique additional dispensing frameworks due to 
political pressures of French farmers and practitioners. The British Competition Commission 
found market distortions in the supply of prescription-only medicines in 2003. This led to the 
UK being the only country that extends prescription and dispensing rights to suitably qualified 
persons, and generally allows internet retail of prescription drugs. Switzerland has not 
complied with the general prescription requirement yet because it contradicts established 
practices (Sager et al. 2011). Thus, without concrete community rules, domestic political 
pressures, practical needs and national institutions accounted for differences in the 
regulations. Similarities can be attributed to institutional features other than EU membership. 
 
Integration and time  
 
Why has Switzerland’s adaptation to the other EU countries apparently not primarily been 
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affected by the existence of EU standards, despite its legal obligations since 2009? The 
adoption of EU rules regarding documentation and supply shortfalls by Switzerland followed 
a historical institutionalist logic in that it required the coincidence of both a window of 
opportunity and the political opportunity structure for change. Historically grown institutions 
such as documentation procedures are particularly rooted. The respective legislative processes 
are still ongoing. These findings are therefore congruent with the assumptions of historical 
institutionalism outlined in Table 2: while EU directives or co-operation may provide a 
window of opportunity for institutional change, they do not suffice. The path-dependent 
development of similar regulations takes time. However, our historical institutionalist 
assumption about the role of EU membership needs refinement. Instead, our observations 
suggest that what facilitated integration was the existence of common binding standards or 
other institutional features combined with sufficient time and the political conditions for their 
adoption. 
 
Settling the battle of theories 
 
This study has analysed the fine-tuning of domestic policies of the dispensing of veterinary 
drugs in five Western European countries. By reassessing EU integration theories, the study 
addresses the “lack of cumulativeness that has marked some of the literature so far” (Treib 
2008: 17).  It contributes to existing research on integration by considering the role of 
institutional affiliation and the existence of EU law in an unexplored policy field. However, 
our causal analysis remains indicative, as we lack complete information about the emergence 
of the regulations.  
We discussed the relative validity of the simplified core assumptions of three dominant 
theories about the decisive driving forces behind integration: neo-functionalism, historical 
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institutionalism and the domestic politics approach. Our findings are not congruent with the 
neo-functionalist assumptions of form following function (for example, Armingeon and 
Bonoli 2006) and spillover processes (for example, Tranholm and Mikkelsen 1991, Niemann 
1998, Vogel 1998, Renner 2009, Sandholtz and Sweet 2010, Stephenson 2012); the approach 
has difficulties explaining both the remaining differences between the domestic regulations 
and their historical development (Risse 2005). Our observations correspond best to the 
historical institutionalist expectation of a path-dependent, incremental evolution of institutions 
(for example, Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, Haverland 2000, Krapohl 2007). The analysis 
of aspects not regulated by EU law highlights that it is not the institutional affiliation in terms 
of EU membership that accounts for similar regulations, but most importantly legal 
harmonisation (Scharpf 2010). Yet it was only in combination with sufficient time and the 
appropriate political opportunity structure that integration also occurred in the non-EU 
member state (Steunenberg and Kaeding 2009, Maggetti et al. 2011). In the absence of these 
features, the development of the national regulations was subject to domestic political 
processes, as assumed by the domestic politics approach (Falkner et al. 2005, Mastenbroek 
and Kaeding 2006, Oosterwaal and Torenvlied 2012). In summary, our findings suggest that 
integration may be the complex result of legal harmonisation from above, time, and political 
will (Perkins and Neumayer 2007).  
Instead of aiming at statistical generalisation, this research contributes to the battle of theories 
over European integration by drawing inferences on their relative explanatory validity to 
explain the cases under investigation (Blatter and Blume 2008: 349). Rather than being 
mutually exclusive, the three theories which were examined each have their particular 
explanatory strengths and weaknesses. Our results support Peterson’s (2001) thesis that neo-
functionalism works best at the super-systemic level of “history-making”, whereas 
institutionalism can better explain how policies are adopted at the systemic level. However, a 
close look at the complex interplay of path dependencies and political processes is needed to 
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understand the fine-grained patterns of the (dis)similarity of domestic policies in Europe.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Scenarios, causal factors and theoretical classification 
Theory about integration Causes Process Result 
Neo-functionalism Similar problem pressure 
Imitation and policy learning 
Regulatory competition 
Legal harmonisation 
Domestic politics 
approach 
Domestic political-institutional factors 
Sources: Starke et al. (2008: 978); authors’ own illustration. 
 
Aspect (partly) observable by the available evidence 
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Table 2: Theoretically expected observations  
Causal 
Factor 
Theory Expected  Not expected  
NF Primary driving force  
If shared: similar solutions regardless of 
existing institutions 
Other factors are decisive 
HI Play a role besides other factors, for 
example by influencing the political 
opportunity structure 
Lead to policy change despite the absence 
of a window of opportunity and the political 
opportunity structure  
DP Structure political interest constellation and 
discussion 
 
Will automatically lead to integration if 
shared  
NF Spillover effects No spillover over a longer period of time 
HI Can create a window of opportunity for 
integration 
Leads to integration regardless of existing 
institutions and political opportunity 
structure  
DP Not decisive Leads to integration although domestic 
politics are unfavorable 
 
NF Domestic institutions: not decisive 
EU membership fosters co-operation  
Inhibit integration despite similar functional 
problems and co-operation  
HI Resist change; basis upon which new 
regulations are built 
Domestic institutions: inertia 
EU membership: integration 
Irrelevance 
DP Structure domestic politics (for example 
veto points) 
 
EU membership leads to integration 
although domestic politics are unfavorable 
 
NF Can create functional problem pressure  Policy change is contingent on critical 
junctures 
HI Create a window of opportunity for 
integration 
Policy change in the absence of a window 
of opportunity 
DP Structure domestic politics  Lead to integration although domestic 
politics are unfavorable 
 
NF Importance of elites’ behavior 
 
Decisive for non-change despite functional 
problem pressures 
HI Provide political opportunity structure for 
policy change  
Irrelevance 
Leads to policy change in the absence of 
some window of opportunity 
DP Decisive, usually different between 
countries 
Irrelevance 
NF = Neo-functionalism  HI = Historical institutionalism  DP = Domestic politics 
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Figure 1: The “life cycle” of a veterinary drug 
 
Source: authors’ own illustration. 
Boxes represent actors and arrows stand for processes. 
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Table 3: Similarity of policies according to existence of EU norm 
Variables 
Pattern of  
Similarity 
…between all 
countries 
…between  
Switzerland and 
EU countries 
…between EU 
countries 
Range 
(Standard  
deviation) 
 
All policy aspects 
29 variables 
 
 
Partial or full  
Similarity 
 
76.9 
 
65.5 
 
84.5 
 
34.5 
(11.2) 
EU directive exists 
18 variables 
 
Partial or full  
Similarity 
81.1 62.5 93.5 
44.4 
(16.6) 
No EU law exists 
11 variables 
Partial or full  
Similarity 
70 70.5 69.7 
36.4 
(13.6) 
Number of observations: 290.      EU = European Union. 
Average similarity was obtained by first calculating the share of bilateral policy similarity (full or partial) 
between all possible combinations of two countries in per cent of all respective policy aspects, and then 
aggregating these bilateral values according to the rules specified in the first row. 
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Table 4: Similarity of policies according to policy aspect 
Variables 
Pattern of  
similarity 
…between all 
countries 
…between 
Switzerland 
and EU 
countries 
…between EU 
countries 
Range 
(Standard  
deviation) 
 
Regulation of  
dispensing of VMPs 
11 variables 
 
 
Partial or 
full  
Similarity 
 
 
78.2 
 
70.5 
 
83.3 
 
27.3 
(9.8) 
Regulation of  
dispensing of MFS 
4 variables 
Partial or 
full  
Similarity 
 
80.0 68.8 87.5 
50.0 
(15.8) 
Documentation 
requirements for 
dispensing* 
8 variables 
Partial or 
full  
Similarity 
 
 
80.0 50.0 100.0 
50.0 
(25.8) 
Controls of 
dispensing*,* 
6 variables 
Partial or 
full  
Similarity 
68.3 75.0 63.9 
50.0 
(16.6) 
Number of observations: 290 EU = European Union  VMP = Veterinary medicinal product 
MFS = Medicated feedstuff 
*More than one EU standards have not been transposed by Switzerland **Aspect not regulated by EU 
Average similarity was obtained by first calculating the share of bilateral policy similarity (full or partial) 
between all possible combinations of two countries in per cent of all respective policy aspects, and then 
aggregating these bilateral values according to the rules specified in the first row. 
 
 
 
 
